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1 Introduction 
Expectations about the interface between scientific research and policy formulation have been 
consolidated under the banner of 'evidence-based policy' (Hoppe, 1999). It proposes that policy makers 
should be informed by scientists and other drug experts, so that policy will reflect accurate factual 
knowledge of e.g. drug effects and risks rather than political biases. However, the main problem with this 
account is that it fails to engage with the complex relationship between policy and science in a meaningful 
manner, with scientific research just being one of the many sources of knowledge used by policy makers 
(Hughes, 2007; Stevens, 2011; Monaghan, 2011).  
 
Carol Weiss, a prominent author in the field of knowledge utilization, identified several meanings of use (or 
models of research utilization) in her work on knowledge utilization and decision making (Weiss, 1979). 
She believes that the utilization of the social sciences in policy is a highly complex phenomenon that can 
be perceived in an enormous diversity of ways. In her typology there are three primary ways in which 
research is used: instrumentally, politically/symbolically and conceptually.  
 
The instrumental view is akin to the 'knowledge-driven model' as well as the 'problem-solving model' 
where research gives direction to policy, and research findings lead to action. This represents the typical 
understanding, a rather static view, of the research-policy nexus but it is arguably the most uncommon 
use of research. This model ignores  that research utilization may also involve issues of (political) power 
and media imperatives. For a study to have a direct bearing on policy, it takes an ‘extraordinary 
concatenation of circumstances' (Monaghan, 2011).  
 
In political/tactical utilization, research is used to support or justify pre-existing preferences or actions or to 
justify delay. In other words, when knowledge is used for political-strategic (or symbolic) reasons, the goal 
is to enhance the position of politicians in decision-making (Huston, 2008). For instance, it can be used to 
silence the arguments of the opposition or to support ideas that the decision-makers have adopted earlier 
(Lampinen, 1992). It has primarily a legitimation function and offers proof of responsiveness. Although the 
political/tactical model determines the ways in which evidence is (or is not) selected in policy decision-
making, its underpinning is still linear (i.e. use of research is rational when powerful groups use it to further 
their own interests) and offers a static, short-term view of the policy making process (Monaghan, 2009). It 
tends to focus on the policy makers and not on other groups who may also be able to influence policy 
(Stevens, 2007).  
 
The conceptual use of research is also termed “enlightenment”. In this delayed and indirect research 
usage, research contributes to the percolation of new ideas and concepts which over time become 
“common knowledge” and contribute to the overall knowledge endeavour rather than one specific policy 
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decision. Thus, it offers a more dynamic perspective of the research-policy nexus and it also emphasises 
how research can be conceived as part of the process of policy-making (e.g. in definitions of social 
problems): (1) it may turn non-problems into policy problems or (2) research can turn a pressing problem 
into a problem of less consequence/attention.  
 
Some authors have recently argued that the theoretical models of research utilization, mentioned above, 
are inadequate grounds to conceptualize the evidence and policy relationships in heavily politicized policy 
areas (e.g. drug policy) as they are too abstract and have a narrow understanding of the nexus 
(Monaghan, 2009; Stevens, 2011). In particular, the existing models do not take into account the 
emergence of new data and the mechanisms through which research is selected for use in policy. In other 
words, they may help to describe the relationship but they are less capable to explain why and how this 
nexus occurs. As a result, newer models are advocated: the evolutionary model and the processual 
model.  
 
Unlike the political/tactical model, the evolutionary model tends to focus not only on the policy makers but 
also on the social structure as important in supporting selection in the use of evidence. In the evolutionary 
approach, some evidence may fit the interests of the powerful groups, other may not. In other words, there 
is a survival of the evidence that fit. Arguments and processes of evidence selection are rather rational as 
it is the social structure which explains the relative power of some groups (Stevens, 2007). Similar with the 
enlightenment model, the evolutionary model has an understanding of the relationship where evidence 
plays a role in the process of decision-making and not just in the outcome of policy formulation. 
Furthermore, although in contrast with the enlightenment model, it offers an analysis of the power 
relationships in the policy making process, taking into account findings or recommendations that have 
been produced by academics, journalists, think tanks, pressure groups or others.  
 
Another model is tentatively advocated by Monaghan (2009). The processual model views the nature of 
policy making as a process. Although evidence may not necessarily be translated into policy outcomes, it 
does constitute a significant aspect of the decision making process (Monaghan, 2009). As this model 
accepts that evidence is not the only factor in the policy making process and that the policy process is 
characterized by ad hoc, back and forth decision making, the model can be thought of as related to the 
enlightenment model.  
 
Drawing on these models of knowledge utilization, the next section will describe the case which will be 
used to illustrate the role of scientific knowledge in the various phases of the development (and 
implementation) of the Belgian cannabis policy. 
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2 The case-study 
The basic Belgian law relating to the traffic in toxic substances, hypnotics, narcotics, disinfectants and 
antiseptics dates from 24 January 1921. The law focused on penal sanctions and paid no attention to the 
drug users themselves. The criminalization of drugs and drug possession was a direct result of 
international developments (Guillain, 2003). Like several other countries, Belgium ratified the International 
Opium Convention in 1912 because of the moral value inherent in this international commitment and the 
importance of being associated with it. For several years, the Law of 24 February 1921, had been an 
efficient instrument to struggle against drug trafficking and drug addiction. However, the 
internationalisation of the production of drugs continued to grow (De Ruyver, e.a., 2000). As a result, 
several multilateral drug control treaties of the UN were established (1961, 1971, 1988).  
 
In Belgium, larger drugs seizures and a rising tide of convictions for drug-related behaviours were 
witnessed during the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, the media increasingly reported about the surprising 
rise in drug use among the population (De Ruyver, 1988). The approach of the drug phenomenon in the 
political debate as well as in the media became very emotional. It was acknowledged that scientific 
knowledge was fallible and scientific input into the policy making process received less attention (De 
Ruyver, 1988). Except for some small modifications (i.e. penalizing some new products like LSD or 
amphetamines), nothing changed in the Belgian legislative, prosecution or policy framework between 
1921 and 1975. However, due to an increasing fear for an uncontrollable drug epidemic and due to 
Belgium’s ratification of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (New York, 1961) as well 
as the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 1971), Belgian policy makers 
decided to implement a more severe legislative framework in the 1970s (Todts, 2004). The basic Belgian 
law of 1921 was modified by the Law of 9 July 1975. 
 
While the drug issue entered the legislative framework at the beginning of the 20th century, the 
foundations of the Belgian drug policy were laid in the second half of the 1990’s. Drug use became more 
visible in certain youth cultures and there was an increasing political pressure for a sound drug policy 
caused by the intensification of the supply of both legal and illegal drugs (in quantity as well as variety), an 
increasing mobility of the demand side, and the increase in social breeding grounds for problematic drug 
use in cities. Gradually, the theme ‘drugs’ entered the political agenda from a variety of perspectives (e.g. 
health, safety and crime prevention, repression, and welfare). Eventually, the policy window was opened 
by a MP of the French-speaking socialist party (PS). In particular, MP Patrick Moriau emphasized publicly 
in the newspaper ‘Le Soir’ (November 17
th
 1995) that he would submit a proposal to legalize cannabis 
possession (in contrast with the current repressive Belgian law). Although it was only a threat (he did not 
submit his proposition), this event actuated the political and parliamentary debate on drugs in Belgium. As 
a result of the commotion regarding the proposition and in order to develop a clear and timely view on all 
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aspects of the drug phenomenon and the drug problem, the federal parliament took the initiative to 
establish a Parliamentary Working Group. The working group focused on the study of the complexity and 
multidisciplinary of the drug phenomenon and the determination of the future orientation of the Belgian 
drug policy. Members of the Parliamentary Working Group relied on several experts to get an idea of 
scientific findings regarding the drug phenomenon. Eventually, it took until 2001 for the Belgian 
government to further elaborate the principles and recommendations of the Parliamentary Working Group 
and to establish the “first national drug strategy”. With this note, a drug policy with a purely criminal focus 
was ‘officially’ replaced by a normalization policy where the drug problem was considered primarily as a 
problem of public health.  
 
Next to topics such as drug epidemiology, prescription and substitution of methadone and/or heroin, 
prison policy, international drug production and traffic, a large part of the discussion in the Parliamentary 
Working Group concerned the legitimacy of the criminalization of drugs (Kaminski, 2003). Similar to the 
evolution in various European countries towards more tolerant policies regarding cannabis possession 
(e.g. Switzerland, Spain, the UK), a debate on a change of cannabis policy sparked off in Belgium. This 
particular debate, initiated in 1996 with the implementation of a Parliamentary Working Group on Drugs 
and revitalized in 2001 by means of the first national drug strategy, focused on what is called the de facto 
depenalisation of cannabis possession. Lengthy and difficult debates and interactions between 
parliamentary members, researchers, the media and the members of the public followed. At the end, as 
part of the implementation of the 2001 national drug strategy, a new drug legislation was endorsed in 
Belgium (2003) which de facto depenalized the possession of cannabis for personal use. 
 
Scheme: Timeline Belgian drug policy (1996-2003) 
 
 
Using the development (and implementation) of the Belgian cannabis policy (1996-2003) as a case study, 
this paper will not pay attention to the other elements of the Belgian drug policy (e.g. prescription and 
substitution of methadone and/or heroin). Instead, we will provide reflections on the contribution of 
(scientific) research in this particular part of the debate. How did parliamentary members and members of 
the government support their ideas and which arguments did they use in rethinking prohibition? Given the 
intense media scrutiny and the large number of competing political parties and their divergent interests in 
the cannabis policy, scientific knowledge may become elements in value-based policy arguments echoed 
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in the debate (Ritter, 2010; Room, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2005). Apart from the knowledge producers 
(academic worlds) and knowledge consumers (decision community), we acknowledge that the media too 
may play an important role in the interaction between science and policy. The role of the media in seeking 
access to policy and influencing policy will be discussed in a separate paragraph.  
 
Until now, data is gathered through the analysis of parliamentary documents. In a following phase we will 
conduct an analysis of media documents as well as interviews with several key informants from the 
Belgian cannabis policy arena. Individuals (policy makers, scientists and journalists) will be selected on 
the basis of the document analysis.  
 
3 The contribution of scientific knowledge 
There has obviously been a contribution of scientific knowledge in the cannabis policy debate between 
1996-2003. Examination of the extent to which scientific knowledge was referenced within questions, 
hearings and policy reports suggested strong utilization. It appeared that scientific knowledge was actively 
taken up by researchers themselves but also by field workers, interest groups, MPs and members of the 
government. However, although scientific knowledge has played a role, it was often a subordinate one to 
other, more salient factors. Knowledge utilization studies already emphasized that policy results form a 
complex process in which multiple factors interact. Weiss (1995) described three categories of factors: 
ideology, interests and information. Similarly, as Kingdon (2002) pointed out, policy making involves a 
complicated, almost subjective, calculus that weighs a number of competing factors including values, 
career aspirations, etc. In our case, we can certainly say that scientific knowledge competed with other 
information (e.g. personal experiences) as well as with ideology. Detailing these types of contributions will 
demonstrate how scientific knowledge interacts with the policy debate on a significant issue like cannabis 
policy.  
 
3.1 Parliamentary Working group on drugs (1996-1997) 
At the time of the Parliamentary Working Group on drugs (1996-1997), scientific drug research was rather 
scarce in Belgium. This uncertainty can be seen as the enemy of policy making. Elvins (2003) stressed 
that whether policy makers turn to science depends on the level of uncertainty about an issue area. If one 
is unsure of what the real problem is, and one cannot predict the effects of these actions, then one would 
not get anything done. Scientific knowledge, then, may be used to reduce uncertainty, such as by 
resolving confusion or misunderstandings, increasing credibility, etc. 
 
Through a bottom-up approach, the Parliamentary Working Group aimed at translating the needs and 
aspirations of 59 experts into useful policy recommendations. National and international experts, working 
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in various domains of the drug field (epidemiology, prevention, treatment, social sector, repression, policy) 
were asked to convey their analysis and their recommendations. We observed that ‘experts’ whose 
discourse was widely perceived as true, included ‘scientists’ (as well as international experts) and 
practitioners working with or against drug users. Often, field workers had a better sense of crucial real-
world information that scientists did not fully appreciate (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010). Also interest 
groups of ex-users and members of the government were included here. Experts were clearly influential in 
setting the political agenda by creating common problem definitions (Weiss, 1979). In other words, 
scientific knowledge did ‘enlighten’ the policy debate: it contributed to the percolation of new ideas 
and concepts and a substantial body of knowledge regarding the development of the Belgian drug policy. 
 
If we zoom in on the discussion regarding cannabis policy, experts agreed on the failure of a total 
prohibition, applied by the Laws of 1921 and 1975 and inspired by the ‘war on drugs’ of the United States. 
However, there was no general agreement on which approach (decriminalisation, depenalisation) was 
best suited when taking into account the international UN treaties that prohibit the legalisation of cannabis 
production, sale and use. The debate fluctuated between extreme positions; it can be seen lying on a 
continuum with prohibition and legalisation at the extremes, where decriminalisation and depenalisation 
were situated somewhere in between. The cannabis debate focusing on the widespread use of cannabis, 
culturally confusing messages about its acceptability or harmfulness, policy options like legalisation and 
decriminalisation, risks or medical benefits of cannabis, etc. reflected a long and often controversial story. 
Within this Parliamentary Working Group, scientific experts often used propositional assumptions (i.e. 
assumptions about what is or can be or will be the case; ‘truth’) and active verbs without any references in 
assuming to possess ‘truth’. For instance, ‘cannabis use leads to...’, ‘it is determined that 90% of the drug 
addicts…’, ‘poly drug use increased’, ‘the war against drugs caused a lot of suffering’, ‘50% of our 
youngsters has experimented with drugs’. A particular factual claim is regarded as ‘true’ not because it 
accurately reflects what is out there, but because it has been certified as ‘true’ by those who are 
considered competent to pass upon the truth and falsity of that kind of claim (Jasanoff, 1990). Field 
workers more often referred to scientific knowledge: e.g. in search of a definition, to find support for a 
policy option or to refer to some (scientific) results of a study conducted by another expert. They also 
pointed at practice-based research as it is closely linked with their field of knowledge. This type of 
research does not meet the traditional scientific research standards. Instead, it rather meets standards 
relating to its usefulness in practice. Representatives of the government attached importance to (foreign) 
scientific knowledge and experts from international organizations like the European Commission and the 
Council of Europe. Members of interest groups (e.g. former or actual drug users) usually referred to their 
own experiences (by means of examples) and to a lesser extent to scientific expertise or field workers. In 
general, bibliographic information regarding scientific research was often not included. In most cases, 
scientific research was presented without naming the author or institutions (‘research shows’, ‘research 
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confirms’, ‘some authors mention’, ‘the literature shows’, etc). Of course, this presentation does not allow 
any judging of the quality and scope of the research used.  
 
Still, the interpretation of some evidence can be contested. We distinguished several forms of misuse of 
science by experts (even scientists). According to Boland (2008), we must be cautious with the accuracy 
of official data as it can be statistically dubious or politically manipulated. Anyone may use whatever data 
are at hand to support their case, regardless of the methodological purity by which it has been developed. 
In the Parliamentary Working Group, some scientists neglected the main principles of scientific research 
by using ambiguous terminologies (e.g. a comparison of percentage users of hashish and percentage of 
users of cannabis was made). Neglecting statistical significance in studying the relationship between 
cannabis use and school absenteeism was an additional problem. For instance, a scientist declared ‘We 
found that truant youth use twice as many illegal drugs‘ while the original source included that ‘non 
statistical significant numbers show that 28,5% of truant youth ever used cannabis’. In another example, 
several studies, using different methodologies, were compared. For instance, a scientist compared an 
opinion poll of a newspaper to a population survey among youth in order to get some valuable and 
comparable results. He mentioned that ‘a school population survey can be compared to the opinion survey 
carried out by the newspaper Le Soir in 1980 as this research was set up in a similar method’. Also 
scientists sometimes neglect their principles of (objective) scientific knowledge. For instance, it was stated 
by a scientist: ‘These numbers are the result of a methodological approach that is not really satisfactory 
from a scientific point of view. Nevertheless, they show that the use of multiple illicit substances has 
increased’. Furthermore, juggling with numbers or scientific results was a common practice. Scientific 
results were distorted in several ways, which were often very subtle: e.g. blunt interpretations, false 
generalizations and causalities, etc. were made. For instance, a scientist stated: ‘surveys show that 20% 
of young students between 12 and 18 years in the Brussels Region uses illegal drugs. Assuming that most 
users are adults between 18 and 45 years old, it is therefore appropriate to double 20% to 40%. In this 
way one may conclude that at least 40% of the population of the Brussels Region smoke cannabis ’. 
Another scientist made a false interpretation regarding poly drug use. In particular, he mentioned that 
‘90% of drug addicts uses several substances‘ while the original research included that ‘90% of the daily 
heroin users are poly drug users’. This misuse of evidence may fuel clear misconceptions about the 
debate. Equally, we can refer to the terminological confusion related to the comparison with the Dutch 
drug policy. Cannabis is not legalized in the Netherlands, as opposed to what was frequently argued. 
Although participants were aware of the Dutch situation, even members of the government (consciously) 
made wrong interpretations in order to find some support of their opinion in the Parliamentary Working 
Group. Federal Minister of Interior Affairs Johan Vande Lanotte (SP – socialist party) mentioned, for 
instance, that ‘in the Netherlands, the negative consequences of legalization are often regretted’. 
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Eventually, after almost 2 years of expert hearings and some working visits, the opinions and statements 
of the experts and members of the government were integrated into a draft of the final conclusions and 
recommendations and presented to the members of the Parliamentary Working Group in order to find 
political support. If we perceive ‘use’ as simply pointing at the names of and references used by the 
consulted field workers and scientists, the draft of these conclusions clearly has displayed sensitivity to the 
views of the consulted experts. However, contributions that were more critical (e.g. representatives of 
interest groups, scientists) had far less impact. Here, alternative approaches, focusing on the largely 
unproblematic characteristic of drug use, were excluded. Clearly, not all types of (scientific) knowledge 
have an equal chance of being used (i.e. selective use of knowledge).  
 
The draft of these final conclusions was then discussed by the parliamentary members of the 
Parliamentary Working Group. While the hearings of the experts were public, the working group met 
behind closed doors. In general, most recommendations of the final draft were followed. However, we 
observed that the cannabis policy was the subject of a political struggle. Members of the Parliamentary 
Working Group were only interested in the ‘right’ policy option or the option causing the ‘best results’. The 
‘right’ policy option was conceived as the option that could deal the most with their concerns regarding 
prevalence numbers, drug related criminality and overcrowded prisons. So, these concerns reflected their 
ideological positions and rested to a lesser extent on the pillars of science. The problem in understanding 
cannabis use and drug problems did not seem to be a lack of intelligent discourse but a plethora of it. 
Suddenly, members of the Parliamentary Working Group found themselves confronted with scientific 
studies containing contradicting findings that may be potentially relevant to their interest. Although 
research really enlightened the cannabis policy debate, it was not decisive because of opinion 
differences between stakeholders about policy goals. The debate about the ends of policies was 
inherently political. One clear example is the adaptation of the recommendation regarding cannabis 
policy. While the final draft (based on the expert hearings) recommended a de facto depenalisation of 
cannabis possession for personal use (i.e. this involves maintenance of criminal penalties in the criminal 
law without any application in practice), the final conclusions and recommendations weakened the original 
message. The final report of the parliamentary working group recommended a distinction between 
possession of cannabis for personal use and possession of other illegal drugs. The possession of 
cannabis for personal use remained an offence, receiving the lowest prosecution priority. In other words, 
the possession of a consumer quantity of cannabis by a non-problem drug user who caused no public 
nuisance was to receive the lowest priority. Members of the conservative parties took the lead to replace 
the phrasing ‘de facto depenalisation’ by ‘lowest prosecution priority’ to avoid discussion about the (anti-) 
prohibition of drug use as well as any comparisons with the Dutch drug policy of tolerance.  
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3.2 Parliamentary discussions: 1997-2000 
After the Parliamentary Working Group, the political attention to the drug issue decreased due to several 
contextual elements. The subject of drugs was overshadowed by the Dutroux case from 1998 and the 
resulting focus on reforms of the judicial authorities and the police (‘Octopus reforms’). Besides, in 1999, 
Belgian voters rejected the longstanding coalition government of Christian Democrats and Socialists and 
voted into power a coalition led by Flemish Liberal Leader Guy Verhofstadt. The first Verhofstadt 
government (1999-2003) was a six-party coalition between the Flemish and Francophone Liberals, 
Socialists, and Greens. The new Prime Minister aimed for a ‘clean break with history’. In the 1999 Federal 
Government Policy Statement, put forward by the new Prime Minister G. Verhofstadt (VLD – liberal party), 
in the House of Representatives, the drugs issue (mentioned under the section ‘ethical topics’) was one of 
the main concerns. Considering scientific research of paramount importance, the Verhofstadt I 
government, for instance, commissioned in 2000 an ‘evaluation research’ of the implementation of the 
final conclusions of the Parliamentary Working Group (cf. Infra).  
 
Nevertheless, the cannabis issue still seeped into the discourse of the following parliamentary debates. In 
seeking to further explore the intersections between science and policy, we investigated the ways in which 
scientific knowledge was publicly used or regarded by members of the parliament ( ‘symbolic agenda’).
1
 A 
parliamentary debate is a game between the majority and the opposition with the last group often (even 
desperately) searching for resources supporting their case. MPs in an oppositional position frequently 
made use of their competence to monitor and control the activities of the government. In general, the use 
of science was the largest among bills and resolutions. Interest in the scientific support of their points of 
view is linked with their aim to increase their credibility. Those who submitted a bill or resolution clearly 
pointed at their aim to take into account the progress in knowledge. For example, two MP’s stated in their 
submitted bill: ‘It is our intention to reach a coherent policy based on objective scientific research, 
independent of ideologies […] Moreover, the claim that cannabis use causes loss of motivation is 
disproven by recent scientific research’. 
 
Footnote references and a bibliography were mostly included. However, when we looked at these 
footnotes in bills and resolutions in detail, it is clear that these references sometimes were incomplete 
(wrong order, no author, no place of publication, no page numbers, etc.) or out-of-date. Although the large 
number of footnote references can be declared by the fact that a bill or resolution has to be concise (Van 
der Hulst, 2010), these footnotes also revealed that the complete, final reports of those studies were not 
consulted in detail and that the internet was an important source in the search for supporting research. For 
instance, some MP’s supported their argumentation with a footnote reference: ‘(Footnote): VAD, Synthesis 
                                                          
1
 In the literature there is a distinction between two types agendas: the substantive agenda and the symbolic agenda. The 
substantive agenda deals with law making, budgetary allocations, sanctioning, nominations, and so on. In contrast, symbolic 
agendas have no real policy consequences (Walgrave e.a., 2008). 
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report, 1999-2000. See www.vad.be/aktueel/persteksten.html for more info’. This finding is maybe in 
accordance with Ritter (2009) who found that the third most frequently mentioned source used by policy 
makers was the internet (notably “Google” and websites of national research centres).  
 
Clearly, science was not the only legitimate and proper basis for policy making. Values, self-interest and 
power also played substantive roles. The parliamentary debates involved questions of power in processes 
of problem definition and perceptions of the strategies needed at the heart of policy elaboration. Members 
of parliament were claiming legitimacy for their political actions. In order to enhance their own position 
research was used selectively by different political parties (opposition versus majority) to silence 
the arguments of the opposition or to support ideas that the policy makers have adopted earlier. 
Arguments were related to the (negative/positive) consequences of policy options or the prevalence data 
of cannabis use, the links between drug use and criminality, the usefulness of the stepping stone theory, 
etc. Linked with the models of knowledge utilization, expertise was used in a political way: to support or 
justify pre-existing preferences or actions. Scientific knowledge used included statistical numbers (i.e. 
prison statistics, epidemiological data, opinion survey), reports of international organizations (e.g. 
EMCDDA, WHO) or conclusions of commissions (e.g. British Wooton Commission (1969), Canadian 
LeDain Commission (1970), Dutch Baan Commission (1972), American Shafer Commission (1972), 
Commission of the Australian Government (1977), French Roques commission (1997), …). For instance, 
some MP’s argued in their law proposition that ‘according to the Roques report, the vast majority of 
cannabis users uses cannabis sporadically and is able to quit completely without a hassle. In addition, the 
report shows that less than 10% of hardcore cannabis users experience difficulties quitting cannabis, if 
desired’.  
 
In Europe, a range of responses had been developed and these approaches ranged from the tolerant 
policy in the Netherlands to strict prohibition in Sweden. The strategy to project the effects of 
depenalisation, decriminalisation or legalisation of cannabis on the basis of analogies to experiences of 
other places was commonly used. Here, MacCoun and Reuter (1997) pointed to the danger of ‘policy 
platonism’, treating policy regimes as ideal types. For instance, it was stated by some MP’s that ‘if we 
depenalise cannabis possession, the demand will increase. That is obvious. The situation in the 
Netherlands confirms this’. Other MP’s referred to the actual policy of Sweden and Finland: ‘In these 
countries, there is a rather repressive drug policy. At the same time, it is found that measures that are too 
strict overreach their aim’. 
 
In the parliamentary discussion between 1997-2000, politics clearly played an important role. Since the 
concept de facto depenalisation was replaced by the lowest prosecution priority for cannabis possession 
for personal use, MPs unclearly referred to the liberalization of cannabis as a de jure depenalisation, a 
decriminalisation and even a legalisation. This appeared to open up debate amongst MPs, the media and 
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the public about whether cannabis possession would remain illegal under the proposed system. The 
opposition frequently used ‘decriminalisation’ and ‘legalisation’, and said that the government scheme 
would ‘allow’ possession and cultivation of cannabis. While the government tried to avoid the terminology, 
one of the primary talking-points of the Federal Minister of Justice during this time involved clarifying that 
the Belgian government was not talking about the legalisation of cannabis use. Over the months of the 
parliamentary debate, the use of similar political tactics continued. Discourses involved attempts to 
enhance the credibility of the opinions or sources offered, even if the quality of the information provided 
was weak. MPs and representatives of the government relied on their personal opinions or experiences, 
more often than on scientific knowledge. In the discourse, we observed concepts like ‘personally’, ‘I know’, 
‘according to me’, ‘it is my opinion that’, etc. Many members of the parliament also made use of rather 
extravagant vocabulary and metaphors to support their argumentation or to name each other. For 
instance, a MP of the radical right wing party Vlaams Blok described ‘science as opium of the people’, a 
statement linked with a famous account made by Marx. An appeal to emotions was another important 
tactic and involved inciting emotions in people in order to persuade them that a particular statement or 
argument was true or false, not taking into account the scientific evidence. In some discourses, emotions 
were emphasized  by frequently linking drug use with committing suicide, HIV, death and criminal 
organizations. Cannabis use was also often presented as the ‘enemy’ of society, of which young people 
can become victims. A MP stated: ‘As the taboo will be removed, a lot of young people will experiment. 
Because of this, we could end up like the Netherlands, which counts 700.000 to one million regular 
cannabis users.’  Furthermore, a lot of members of the Parliament spoke from their position as a MP and 
complemented this with their other roles. For instance, participants made references to their role as a 
doctor, as a parent, as a field worker (e.g. health worker, leader of a youth movement or animator), as a 
mayor or as a member of the Council of Europe. Here, it was even stated that the expertise as a parent 
was equally important as the expertise of a scientist. ‘You do not need to be a scientist or psychologist in 
order to know this . More important, I am a parent and my children are around 20 years old.’ Finally, some 
efforts were made to discredit scientists or MPs personally, rather than by challenging scientific results. By 
criticizing their role and credibility, they attempted to increase the credibility of their own assumptions and 
to counter the arguments of their opponents. For instance, a member of the green party, Mr. Jef Tavernier, 
was the object of some personal insults: ‘Mr Tavernier has his head in the clouds. These clouds are rather 
green because of his cannabis use’. 
 
 
3.3 First national drug strategy (2001) 
In 2001, the recommendations and guidelines proposed by the Parliamentary Working Group were 
translated by the executive power into a policy document. Accordingly, we were able to get an idea of the 
way in which scientific knowledge entered the governmental discussion (‘substantive agenda’). 
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A federal working group, including (representatives of) the Federal Ministers of Justice, Interior Affairs, 
Social Affairs, Economic Affairs and Public Health, was charged with drawing up a draft of a Federal Drug 
Policy Note taking into account, amongst others, the drug policies of surrounding countries. Some drug 
policy advisors of these countries (i.e. the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg) were therefore invited to 
the federal working group drug policy. The federal working group also received the main policy documents 
regarding drug policy in each country. These documents included some general statements about drug 
use and its consequences on public opinion, prevalence numbers, etc. Thus, drug policy experiences 
(related to prevention, harm reduction, assistance, re-integration and enforcement (with special attention 
to the cannabis policy)) in each country were compared. The federal working group linked the efficiency of 
each policy option with some statistical numbers of the EMCDDA as the prevalence rates were perceived 
as the best standard. It was remarkable that the interest in statistical numbers was only related to 
problematic drug use, drug deaths, infection diseases and police arrests. Again (similar to the 
Parliamentary Working Group), the ‘right’ policy option was conceived as the option that could deal the 
most with their concerns about prevalence rates, overdoses, drug related criminality and overcrowded 
prisons. Although the prevalence rates were presented in a correct way, those statistical numbers were 
accompanied with an interpretation of their level (low, high, moderate). However, such direct comparisons 
between national policies cannot be made because these data are affected by differences in definition and 
statistical units (persons, offences, and arrests) and changing drug policies or laws.  
 
Eventually, the Federal Drug Policy Note consisted of three distinguishable parts. The first part captured 
the recommendations of Parliamentary Working Group. The second part of the Note described the actual 
state of the drug problem and captured those recommendations which already had been realized by the 
time the Note was created. What had actually already been realized followed roughly the conclusions of 
the ‘evaluation research’ conducted in 2000. In this respect, the Federal Drug Policy Note was a revision 
and completion of the evaluation research. Many wordings of the research report were copied into the 
Note. Even the statements that were not supported by scientific knowledge were included. For instance, 
statements about the percentage of problematic use and the extent of poly drug use among the general 
population. As this (policy funded) evaluation research gave direction to the Belgian drug policy (cannabis 
policy in particular), and finally led to action/implementation, we found an example of instrumental 
knowledge utilization (i.e. utilization as an outcome).  
 
The third part contained several action points. For instance, the federal government planned to amend the 
Belgian Narcotic Drug Law of 1921. The modalities had to be outlined in Royal Decrees. In line with these, 
the Minister of Justice and the Board of Prosecutors General had the task to issue a new Ministerial 
Circular. It was recommended that the guidelines of the cannabis policy should meet the objection of the 
‘evaluation research’ that there was a lack of uniformity in the prosecution of cannabis use by different 
public prosecutor’s offices. This was, among others, attributed to too vague notions such as ‘social 
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nuisance’ and ‘problematic use’ and ‘quantity for personal use’. However, we observed an important 
shortcoming in attempting to meet this deficiency. The vagueness of the notions in the Federal Drug 
Policy Note was not solved at all. Again, they remained too blurry and open for interpretation of prevention 
workers, social workers, and the general public and the cannabis users. Here, we noted a rather 
symbolic usage: within the government report there was a reference to the governments’ 
investment in the research, by way of demonstrating commitment and responsiveness. 
 
 
3.4 Cannabis law reform (2002-2003) 
As part of the implementation of the 2001 Federal Drug Policy Note, on 21th June 2002, a bill was 
submitted by the government and sent over to the parliament. Although the debate largely focused on 
juridical-technical issues, the drug law reform also involved sifting through multiple versions of evidence.  
 
Again, several experts were invited to contribute to the debate. Similar with the Parliamentary Working 
Group, these experts included scientists (5), field workers (16) and representatives of an interest group (3) 
(i.e. Parents against drugs). The expert hearings in the commission of Public Health (2002-2003) once 
more introduced a long (political) discussion with several contradicting points of view regarding which 
option would fit with the real circumstances best. The debate about cannabis policy consequently came 
down to whether we should continue the de facto depenalisation of personal cannabis possession, or 
whether we should formalize current practice by legislating to remove criminal penalties for personal 
possession. At that time, the chances of a thorough liberalization of cannabis policy were already receded 
for a number of reasons. First, international drug control treaties still severely restricted the available 
policy options by excluding any form of a legal cannabis market. Secondly, the discussion about the 
cannabis policy took into account another amount of scientific research, approaching cannabis from a new 
angle. This research concerned harmfulness of cannabis, THC level, the connection between cannabis 
use and psychiatric disorders (e.g. depression, schizophrenia,…), cannabis dependence, etc. However, 
this larger focus on the harmfulness cannabis (linked with schizophrenia, the higher % of THC, etc.) and 
the attention to the correlation between early and regular cannabis use and the risk of developing 
schizophrenia, depression or other psychotic disorders came rather late. As the first studies about this 
association date back from the beginning of the 1970s with an increasing predominance of neurobiological 
research from 1995 onwards (Vuillaume, 2008), it is rather remarkable that these elements were only 
integrated in the Belgian debate after 2002. At the same time, the ‘precautionary principle’ was introduced 
and integrated in the discussion. The precautionary principle entails that in order to intervene to limit a 
risk, no full scientific knowledge of that risk is needed. This means that if there is a chance of irreversible 
damage, a lack of full scientific proof may not be used to postpone measures. Thus, the persuasive 
burden in these parliamentary debates was accordingly higher for advocates of cannabis law reform: they 
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had to persuade the community that it is possible to change the law without increasing cannabis use and 
harm.  
 
The bill was adopted only a few days before the federal parliamentary elections on May 18
th
 2003. As a 
result, it was no surprise that politicians were concerned about how their decisions and actions were 
viewed by potential voters at the next election. The attention paid to the elections shows that MPs really 
attach importance to their future electability. This is, of course, linked with obtaining high levels of support 
for the cannabis policy option from the public opinion. During the election campaign, the majority stated 
that the new legislation was more stringent than the previous version. The oppositional Christian-
Democratic Party stated that the Federal Government had made the legislation too tolerant and that it 
encouraged people to use drugs (Gelders & Van Mierlo, 2004). Clearly, actions or decisions often 
originate from self-interest in attaining greater authority, a higher position or favoring certain electorates. 
Within this framework, ideology ensured that research evidence was selectively cited in the debate about 
the cannabis law reform. Each “side” again highlighted different sets of harms to highlight the negative 
elements of the position of which they disapprove while discounting the positive ones. Supporters of 
prohibition focused on the harms caused by cannabis use. The evidence that cannabis use can adversely 
affect the mental health (e.g. depression, schizophrenia,…) of some adolescents and young adults has 
been seen as undermining the simplest argument: that cannabis causes no harm. Scientific results that 
contradict policy interests were ignored. For instance, they ignored the social costs of prohibition and 
survey results that had failed to find a larger increase in rates of cannabis use in states that had 
decriminalized cannabis. Instead, they appealed to the “common sense” view that reducing penalties use 
must increase cannabis use.  
 
4 Role of the media 
The media has an important function in political and societal discussions. As illegal drugs are clearly 
newsworthy, the role of the media can be a significant one. It is an institution that helps to shape not only 
the policy agenda of problems but also the political response to them (Devos e.a., 2010). In other words, 
media are assumed to play an integral role in shaping policy making (Hall, 1997; Lenton, 2004; Hall, 
2009). 
 
Already since the Parliamentary Working Group, the topic ‘drugs’ received a lot of media attention. The 
media simplified the complexity of the discussion in the Parliamentary Working Group to one element: 
cannabis policy. From a report of more than thousand pages, only one topic was selected. Moreover, the 
media representations affected the policy makers’ understanding and the public’s understanding of the 
cannabis debate. The media may tell us what to think or not to think about (Wolfsfeld, 2011). As the 
number of news reports on the cannabis issue was rather high during 1996-2003, this source frequently 
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triggered MPs to ask questions to the minister in charge or to place topics on the political agenda. In other 
words, the parliamentary debate was quite clearly and strongly led by media content (Walgrave e.a., 
2008). For instance, a question of a MP started with ‘I was completely surprised by the messages spread 
by the media this week. As a result of a few studies, – about which I have my doubts as well – your  
Ministry proposed selling cannabis at pharmacies as of 2004. Now, my question is....’. 
 
Even the governmental debate was influenced by the media. Shortly before the presentation of the 
Federal Drug Policy Note by the Federal Government, a lot of confusion about the cannabis policy arose. 
First, in November 2000, senator Frans Lozie (AGALEV – green party) caused a sensation by arguing in 
favor of legalizing ‘hard’ drugs. Although the senator was criticized by several political parties as well as by 
his own party and the Federal Minister of Public Health, Mrs. Aelvoet (AGALEV – green party), a letter 
leaked to a newspaper showing that Minister Magda Aelvoet actually agreed with the senator. At the same 
time, some preliminary versions of the Federal Drug Policy Note were leaked to the press. As a result, 
positive and negative elements were discussed in the media before the Note was officially launched. In 
reaction to the media debate, the competent ministers (Federal Minister of Justice Marc Verwilghen (VLD 
– liberal party) and Federal Minister of Public Health Magda Aelvoet (AGALEV – green party)) caused 
confusion about whether and when the possession of cannabis would be legal and what would be the 
legal consequences for the possession of cannabis. (Gelders & Vander Laenen, 2007). Of course, this 
confusing communication was enlarged by the media. These representations created a ‘moral panic’ 
among the public and sent wrong or confusing signals (towards youth). In their ability to exclude nuanced 
policy options from the media, policy makers and the public were invited to believe that they had to take 
sides in the cannabis debate: either cannabis use is harmless (or at least less harmful than alcohol), 
hence it should be decriminalized (if not legalized); or cannabis is harmful to health, and therefore its use 
should remain prohibited.  
 
The media framings also affected the relevance and value of research evidence to the debate. The 
media frequently acted as a source of police statistics, emergency cases, inter(national) cannabis 
prevalence rates and other (scientific) knowledge. Using the media may be an important part of 
disseminating drug policy research in an attempt to make drug policy more ‘evidence-based’ (Lenton, 
2004). In analyzing the parliamentary and governmental documents, we found some references to 
scientific reports as well as statements of some experts (i.e. field workers and scientists) presented in the 
media. Although the media may inform the public and the policy makers about the existence of a certain 
expertise, the report of findings or the citation of experts was often wrong or blunt. For instance, although 
several experts agreed in the Parliamentary Working Group that the number of drug users among 
detainees raised from 1-1,5% in 1970 to 40% in 1996, the media reported ‘In this way, the number of 
people in prison for drug related crimes has risen from 1% in 1970 to over 50% as of today’. 
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Of course, by using the media as a source of scientific findings or expert knowledge, one can never be 
sure whether the results are presented correctly or wrongly in the media (Skolnikoff, 1999). The 
statements may be perceived as an artefact of the way the media handles the issue rather than a true 
reflection of the scientific results. However, members of the parliament or government did not question the 
correct interpretation by the media, they did not even take into account the original source. For instance, a 
MP referred to an article in the newspaper: ‘that article refers to a study carried out by American and 
Australian researchers. According to them, drug or alcohol dependency is not related to the current family 
situation or the genes. The researchers also claim that the initial age of marihuana use is not of any 
significance. From these objective data, we can derive that cannabis is all but harmless’. 
 
Another example in which the media simplifies the value of ‘good’ scientific evidence, is called ‘media 
advocacy’ (Wolfsfeld, 2011). Media as such seems to be an important resource in supporting assumptions 
or ideas. In other words, media is used strategically to promote or to advance a certain policy initiative. As 
MPs as well as representatives of the government do acknowledge the emotional tone of the media, they 
frequently used these ‘non-rational’ arguments in supporting their view (e.g. against legalisation). For 
example, Minister of Interior Affairs Johan Vande Lanotte (SP – socialist party) used a newspaper article 
as a single source for his statements about the drug policy in the United States. He stated: ‘the following 
data are largely copied from the article of the fairly renowned ‘Pino Arlachchi’ in ‘L’espresso’ of 16 April 
1996’. 
 
Nevertheless, in general, the media as a source is most frequently used by MPs in an oppositional 
position. They used the media in order to support their assumptions about the prevalence and risks of 
cannabis use, the medical use of cannabis and the consequences of the cannabis prosecution policy. 
Even a journalist of a Belgian magazine was cited and perceived as a kind of ‘expert’: ‘We totally agree 
with a journalist who states the following in Knack (a Belgian magazine): The problem with the circular 
letter is the lack of clear distinction between the use and possession of cannabis. You can be high but you 
cannot carry around cannabis’. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Ideally, developing and implementing policy is a deliberative process in which all the information and 
arguments that are relevant to the issue are equally treated. However, in reality it often falls short of this 
ideal. Policy debates are often simplified with evidence of harm caused by cannabis use and international 
drug control treaties taken as supporting current prohibitive policy (Hall & Lynskey, 2009). Anti-drug policy 
has also been firmly planted in the soil of fear with the media playing a crucial role (Boland, 2008). 
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Research contributed to the Belgian debate by clarifying factual issues, identifying options for 
interventions, evaluating the effects of current policies and changing conceptual understandings of the 
problems that policy is designed to address. First of all, there has been a scientific input by inviting several 
scientists to the hearings of the Parliamentary Working Group on drugs. Secondly, during the 
parliamentary debate, several MPs based their questions, interpellations, resolutions or bills on scientific 
findings or statements of scientists. For instance, the resubmission of adapted bills was based on more 
(recent) scientific findings and the submission of amendments was supported by a lot of 
research/statistics. Thirdly, we observed use of scientific research in the development of the first Belgian 
drug strategy by the Federal government. Further, experts were also invited to contribute to the debate in 
the commission of Public Health (Chamber of Representatives) regarding the bill submitted by the 
government in 2002. In general, it appears that scientific knowledge is most actively taken up within policy 
processes, such as where evidence is given in inquiries, questions or submissions (‘symbolic agenda’). It 
occurs less in policy outcomes (‘substantive agenda’). This is in line with some knowledge utilization 
models (e.g. enlightenment model, evolutionary model, processual model) which apply an understanding 
of the relationship between science and policy where evidence plays a role in the process of decision-
making and not just in the outcome of policy formulation. 
 
We found more evidence to support some types of research utilization. We observed instrumental use of 
the ‘evaluation research’ in the development and implementation of the first national drug strategy. 
Scientific knowledge also contributed to an overall ‘enlightenment’ in bringing together a substantial body 
of knowledge about the drug phenomenon in the two formal advisory structures (i.e. the Parliamentary 
Working Group and the debate in the commission of Public Health). Most of the time, we noted 
symbolic/political utilization. Scientific knowledge was often used selectively by different actors to support 
competing policies. The reality for researchers is that their research will be used by politicians to support 
their arguments when the research findings are consistent with their beliefs and will be ignored or 
criticized when the research suggests a contrary policy position.  
 
Moreover, it also became clear that evidence is not the only player in the policy making process. A 
number of factors were decisive. Firstly, Belgium is a signatory to international control treaties of the UN 
that prohibit the legalisation of cannabis production, sale and use. These treaties were strongly supported 
by the international community and the United States. Thus, the role that scientific knowledge could play 
was already constrained from the beginning. Secondly, the media can set the agenda and define public 
interest and seep into political debate and decision making. Media framing of the drug policy clearly 
encouraged the selective appeal on evidence about the (negative) effects of cannabis. Thus, we cannot 
only attribute the blame for the misuse or misrepresentation of evidence on policy makers and scientists. 
Thirdly, individual value systems and ideologies played an important role. It influenced the type of interests 
the members of the parliament or government developed and the type of information they gathered and 
20 
 
approved. The debate can be perceived as an ideological struggle between prohibitionists and anti-
prohibitionists, based on ‘power’ relations. Political discourse knowingly misrepresented the facts for 
political ends. Recorded speech acts or arguments were used to enact power, and hence also to exercise 
and to reproduce dominance. The language reflected certain values even though they attempted to 
appear neutral. In analyzing the parliamentary debate, we acknowledged power mechanisms. 
Terminology and emotion played an important role in the cannabis debate. From the start, MPs unclearly 
referred to the liberalization of cannabis as a de jure depenalisation, a decriminalisation and even a 
legalisation. This appeared to open up the debate amongst MPs, the media and the public about whether 
cannabis possession would remain illegal under the proposed system. Many members of the parliament 
also made use of rather extravagant vocabulary and metaphors. Drug policy clearly is a perfect example 
of a complex social domain driven by highly emotional arguments.  
 
So far, we have been using an analysis of parliamentary and governmental documents to support 
preliminary claims about the relationship between science and policy. This paper does not have the goal 
to cover the topic exhaustively. In analyzing these documents, we are aware of some pitfalls and 
limitations. For instance, policy makers know that they always talk ‘for the record’ and that the press is 
keeping an eye on them. Critical statements or discussions are therefore commonly omitted in these 
documents. Furthermore, we are aware that the absence of a reference in a document does not simply 
imply that a particular research is not used. Finally, some of many notable elements that we want to 
further elaborate in the following phases are: the importance for interest groups and the media in regard to 
producing facts, findings or recommendations as well as the influence of (more) informal contacts between 
experts and policy makers. For example, we believe that the selection and involvement of experts (e.g. in 
the Parliamentary Working Group) may be used to enact power, and likewise also to exercise and to 
reproduce dominance. By means of interviews we want to elaborate whether more care was given to 
ideological balance than to the search for answers. 
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